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1 Introduction 
Milton Friedman has famously argued that manager’s responsibility is “to conduct the business in 
accordance with their [the shareholders’] desires, which generally will be to make as much 
money as possible...” Friedman’s key argument was that if a manager who is not the owner of a 
company uses company resources for causes that do not generate value for the shareholders, he is 
“spending someone else’s money for a general social interest” (Friedman, 1970). In his view, it 
is – if anything – the duty of the shareholders themselves to spend their own money for social 
causes.  
In this paper we argue that shareholders who are interested merely in maximizing shareholder 
value (such that they share Friedman’s goal ex-post) should not necessarily pick a manager who 
pursues this goal. From an ex-ante perspective, it may well be in their interest to employ a 
manager who cares for social causes, because doing so will motivate employees. In line with 
Friedman’s argument, this indeed may be costly to shareholders ex-post. But even selfish money 
maximizing shareholders will ex-ante benefit from having more motivated employees.  
In particular, we investigate theoretically and experimentally a situation where an owner of a firm 
can choose between different types of managers, i.e. those that are selfishly interested in a pure 
shareholder value maximization and others that are also interested to benefit social causes. We 
show in a formal model and three lab experiments, that ex-post shareholder value is always 
higher when a money maximizing manager executes residual control rights. Yet, this does not 
always hold true from an ex-ante perspective when contracts are incomplete and the firm 
employs workers who anticipate how the firm’s resources are spent. In this case, our model 
shows that choosing a manager with a social interest (contributing to a “larger objective”) can 
serve as a commitment device that raises employee motivation. That is, ex-post losses in 
shareholder value can be offset by motivational gains ex-ante.  
Bénabou and Tirole (2009) distinguish “win-win” corporate social responsibility encompassing 
social activities that in fact serve shareholder interest1 from insider-initiated corporate 
philanthropy that can be driven by genuine social concerns of management but generates losses 
                                                        
1 This is what Baron (2001) calls “Strategic CSR“, i.e. CSR activities that for instance serve to attract customers and 
strengthen a firm’s market position. 
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in shareholder value. Borrowing this notion, we thus argue that hiring a manager who is 
genuinely interested in (costly) insider initiated corporate philanthropy in fact can help to 
generate win-win CSR for shareholders in the longer term. 
In essence, our argument is that shareholder value maximization – even when it is a legitimate 
objective of controlling shareholders – may not be a sensible objective for managers who execute 
control rights. A manager who too narrowly follows this goal may simply not inspire her 
workforce sufficiently. This argument is also reflected in thoughts put forward by Jack Welch, 
the former CEO of General Electric (sometimes regarded as the “father of the shareholder value 
movement”), in an interview with the Financial Times (FT 13 Mar 2009) long after his 
retirement. According to Jack Welch, “the emphasis executives and investors had put on 
shareholder value [..] was misplaced” and “managers and investors should not set share price 
increases as their overarching goal. [..] On the face of it, shareholder value is the dumbest idea 
in the world. [..] Shareholder value is a result, not a strategy . . . Your main constituencies are 
your employees, your customers and your products.”.  
After formalizing this idea in a theoretical model, we first analyze descriptive field data to study 
the association between employer’s social engagement and employee motivation. We use a 
linked employer-employee data set generated on behalf of the German Federal Ministry of Labor. 
This is a rich data set with survey responses by 6.557 employees in 947 establishments and 
contains information about management practices and an employee level survey on attitudes and 
personality. We indeed find that employees display significantly higher levels of engagement 
when they perceive their employer to be more charitable.  
We then study the causal behavioral effect of choosing a prosocial manager on (i) employees 
motivation and (ii) ex-post value creation in a series of lab experiments. In the experiments, 
participants first receive an endowment and are asked to decide how much of it they want to 
donate to a renowned charity. After that, participants are randomly assigned to groups of three – 
“companies” – and have a role of an owner, employee or manager. Subjects in the role of 
managers are classified as either “low donors” or “high donors”, depending on their previous 
donation decision. Each subject in the role of an employee receives an initial endowment and 
decides how much effort to spend in order to generate “resources of the company”. Agents are 
also informed that in the subsequent stage of the experiment their assigned manager would decide 
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how to use these resources. The allocation decision that the manager has to make is what share of 
the resources to invest in a social cause (generating donations for “Doctors without Borders”). 
The remainder of resources is used to generate profits which are split between the owner and 
manager.  
We find that subjects in the role of employees exert more effort when the respective manager is a 
“high donor”. Hence, knowing that the person who will decide on the use of the resources is 
prosocial is motivating. The managers who are “high donors” then again invest more of the 
resources to generate charitable donations which – conditional on the resources generated by the 
employee – leads to lower profits ex-post. However, in our experiments these ex-post losses are 
fully offset by ex-ante gains in employee motivation such that the “shareholder value” generated 
is not reduced when a prosocial manager is in place. Moreover, overall efficiency is significantly 
larger with a prosocial manager as significantly more donations are generated without lowering 
profits.  
In additional experiments, we show the results hold in a real-effort environment (Experiment 2) 
and in an extended game in which an owner can actively choose a manager (Experiment 3). In 
the latter experiment, we implement a matching mechanism in which owners state their 
preference for a manager’s type and then managers are allocated to owners if there is a sufficient 
supply of the desired type. By applying the strategy method we make use of this assignment 
mechanism to study motivational reactions not only to the type of the manager but also to the 
revealed preferences of the owner. We find that more effort is exerted if the owner had a 
preference to employ a prosocial manager even if the actually assigned manager is not prosocial. 
In other words, the motivational effects on employees are not driven by a consequentialist motive 
alone (“The resources generated by me will be well spent”) but also by a deontological one (“The 
party who held the decision rights was well intentioned when picking the person deciding on the 
allocation of resources”). 
In a recent contribution Hart and Zingales (2017) critically discuss Friedman’s arguments from a 
different angle. They explore a setting in which shareholders may care for social causes but take 
these concerns into account only when being pivotal in decisions relevant to these social causes. 
They show that in such a setting the market value of a firm (i.e. the monetary shareholder value) 
does not fully reflect the welfare of shareholders. Hence, while Hart and Zingales show that 
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socially concerned shareholders may not be well represented by shareholder value maximizing 
managers, we argue that even money maximizing shareholders may not be well represented by 
shareholder value maximizing managers. 
Our paper also contributes to a growing literature on social incentives and employee motivation. 
In lab experiments, Tonin and Vlassopoulus (2015) show that social incentives (i.e., a piece rate 
or a fixed donation transferred to a charity) lead to a rise in productivity but are not as effective as 
monetary incentives in motivating workers. Imas (2014) and Charness et al. (2016) also compare 
monetary and social incentives in a form of a piece rate to a charity and find that social incentives 
work better when the stakes are low but are not more effective than monetary incentives when the 
stakes are high. Koppel and Regner (2014) analyze the effect of CSR on the agents’ effort in an 
experimental gift-exchange game and find that agents’ efforts increase according to the share of 
profit that principals donate to the charity. Similarly, Cassar (forthcoming) shows that in a gift-
exchange game agents are motivated by a principal’s piece-rate donation to exert more effort. 
Kajackaite and Sliwka (2017) show that agents exert higher efforts when principals ex-ante had 
donated to charitable cause and identify that reciprocal altruism is the key behavioral driver. 
Furthermore, our paper relates to the literature on motivated agents and working for a mission 
(see, for instance Besley and Ghatak (2005) and Delfgaauw and Dur (2008)).   
The previous literature mainly concentrated on whether agents’ motivation can be enhanced by a 
prosocial activity of the principal in two tier principal agent settings. We study a three tier 
structure and show that even a selfish owner may prefer to let a prosocial manager decide on the 
allocation of surplus in a firm as this serves a commitment device to motivate employees.  
The paper is organized as follows: In sections 2, we describe theoretical predictions. Section 3 
reports results from the field data. In sections 4-6, we describe experimental design and results 
from laboratory experiments. In section 7, we conclude. 
2 A Model 
2.1 The Set-Up 
Consider a model where an owner/shareholder  of a company has to decide what kind of 
manager  to employ. Managers are characterized by their type  ∈ 0,1
 which determines the 
extent to which they care for social concerns that are beyond the material interest of the firm. The 
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firm employs an agent who observes the type of the selected manager and then decides on how 
much effort  ∈ 0, 
 to invest at private costs  (with  > 1), which determines the amount of 
“resources” available to the firm  =  ⋅ . The manager then decides on an amount  of these 
resources that is donated for a social cause (or is, for instance, spent on unobserved customer 
benefits). The welfare gain generated from a charitable investment of  is equal to  = . 
The remainder is invested in a technology generating a shareholder return of ,  =  − . 
The manager owns a share  of stocks such that her payoff is given by ,  +  ⋅ . 
Shareholders  are purely interested in maximizing shareholder value 1 −  ⋅ , . 
Agents are also characterized by their type  which determines the extent to which they care for 
social concerns that are beyond the material interest of the firm. An employee’s utility function is  ⋅  − . 
2.2 Donations and Incentives 
After the agent has exerted her efforts a manager of type  maximizes  max#  −  +  ⋅ . 
Solving this optimization problem yields the following result: 
Proposition 1. The amount donated to a charity by a manager ,  = $$ + $  
is strictly increasing in her type  and the effort  exerted by the agent. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
The manager thus trades-off personal gain and charitable giving. A more prosocial manager 
donates a larger share of the generated resources  to the charity. But this share is decreasing in 
the size of the bonus . 
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The agent now anticipates the manager’s behavior and an agent with social concerns  
maximizes max%&  ⋅ ,  − '. (.   ∈ 0, 
,  
which leads to the following: 
Proposition 2. The efforts of an agent of type  when working for a manager of type  are 
 = )*+ ,- $ + $  12/
$$01 , 2 
Prosocial agents work harder when the firm employs a prosocial manager. If the upper bound of 
effort   is sufficiently large there is a complementarity between the manager’s and agent’s type, 
i.e. prosocial agents work the harder, the more prosocial the manager’s type. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Hence, employing a prosocial manager can be an incentive device: it serves as a commitment that 
the efforts of the agent are used also for a cause valued by the agent. Moreover, as long as there is 
an internal solution (i.e. the agent works less than his full capacity) there is a complementarity 
between the agent’s and the manager’s degree of prosocial inclinations: the benefit of having a 
prosocial manager is higher when the agent is more prosocial. 
Finally, we can explore the effect on expected shareholder returns 1 − ,  = 1 −  3, , 4 , , 56. 
Note that there is a clear trade-off: a prosocial manager induces higher incentives ex-ante as ,  is increasing in  but also lower shareholder returns ex-post (i.e. for a fixed level of 
effort) as the partial derivative 
7#89,%789 > 0. It turns out, that shareholder value is a non-
monotonic function of the managers degree of prosocial preferences: 
Proposition 3. Expected shareholder returns are inversely U-shaped in the prosociality of the 
manager . 
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Proof: See Appendix. 
Hence, the model implies the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1. Agents work harder when managers are more prosocial, and this effect is stronger 
for more prosocial agents. 
Hypothesis 2. Prosocial managers spend a larger share of profits on charitable causes. 
Hypothesis 3. Shareholder value is inversely U-shaped in the degree of the manager’s prosocial 
inclinations. 
In the following, we first provide descriptive field evidence for the first hypothesis and then test 
all three hypotheses in a series of lab experiments. 
3 Descriptive Field Evidence 
To test the first hypothesis, we use descriptive field evidence from a linked employer-employee 
data set generated on behalf of the German Federal Ministry of Labor, the Linked Personnel 
Panel (LPP).2 The data set comprises a representative firm level survey on the use of 
management practices and an employee level survey on attitudes and personality. In our analyses, 
we use two most recent 2014 and 2016 waves which include an employee-level assessment of the 
firm’s prosocial activities. It leads us to a rich data set with survey responses by 6.557 employees 
in 947 establishments. While the sample of surveyed employees changes between the two waves, 
we have survey responses from a subset of 1.363 employees for both waves such that we can also 
estimate panel regressions for this subset. 
The dependent variable in our analyses is Employee Engagement. It is a common psychological 
construct used to measure an employee’s level of personal investment in the tasks performed on a 
job (see, for instance, Christian et al., 2011). The panel we use contains a nine-item version of the 
Utrecht Work Engagement Scale – one of the most widely used psychological scales to measure 
work engagement (Schaufeli et al., 2002; Schaufeli and Bakker, 2004). Some sample items are: 
“I am enthusiastic about my job”, “My job inspires me”, “I feel happy when I am working 
intensely”, and “I am immersed in my work“.  
                                                        
2 See, for instance, Kampkötter et al. (2016) for a detailed overview of the data set. 
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The independent variables we use are Perceived Prosocial Activity and Altruism. Perceived 
Prosocial Activity measures to what extent the employees find their employers to be engaged in 
social and charitable activities. The item the LPP uses is the following: “Management also 
supports charitable and socially valuable projects outside of the firm”. The variable Altruism 
measures the altruism of employees. The item on altruism reads “How would you rate your 
personal willingness to share with others without getting something in return?”3 This item is 
similar to the experimentally validated survey item in Falk et al. (2016). 
We report the regression results in Table 1. Note that both, altruism and perceived prosocial 
activity are standardized variables with mean zero and standard deviation 1. In Columns (1), (2), 
(4) and (5), we report OLS regression results, and in Columns (3) and (6) fixed effects regression 
results. In line with Hypothesis 1, employees display significantly higher levels of engagement 
when they perceive their employer to be more charitable. The regressions also show that 
employee engagement is higher for more altruistic employees. Finally, as columns (2) and (5) 
show, the interaction term between altruism and perceived prosocial activity is strictly positive 
and highly significant. That is, in line with Hypothesis 1, the regressions suggest that the more 
altruistic the employees, the stronger their work engagement is affected by the employers’ 
prosocial activities.   
 
                                                        
3 All personality measures such as the item assessing altruism are asked only once. In each wave new responds are 
added to the survey to replace employees that were not available for an interview. Each time a new respondent is 
sampled, responses to the personality are collected. 
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Table 1: Engagement, altruism and perceived social activities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS OLS FE OLS OLS FE 
Altruism (std.) 0.141*** 0.143***  0.138*** 0.140***  
 (0.0142) (0.0141)  (0.0146) (0.0145)  
       
Perceived prosocial 
activity (std.) 
0.150*** 0.150*** 0.00756 0.155*** 0.154*** -0.00631 
(0.0135) (0.0133) (0.0207) (0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0224) 
      
Altruism x Perceived 
prosocial activity (std.) 
 0.0469*** 0.0378**  0.0451*** 0.0382* 
 (0.0132) (0.0189)  (0.0131) (0.0222) 
       
Employee controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Establishment controls No No No Yes Yes No 
Employee fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 7912 7912 7920 7063 7063 7186 
R
2 0.046 0.049 0.008 0.100 0.102 0.015 
Notes: The dependent variable is employee engagement (standardized). Robust standard errors clustered on 
establishment in parentheses. Wave 2016 dummy included. Employee controls are dummies for white collar 
worker, manager, part time work, performance pay, recent promotion, highest educational degree, highest 
vocational degree, wage, age, and gender. Establishment controls are dummies for industry, region, 
establishment size and ownership.  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
In addition to the main analyses, columns (3) and (6) report results from fixed effects regressions 
in which we estimate to what extent changes in employees’ perceptions about the employer’s 
charitable activities predict changes in their work engagement.  We have data from 1.363 
employees who were asked the Perceived Prosocial Activity question in both waves. While we do 
not observe that changes in perceptions about the employer’s charitable activities predict changes 
in engagement for average employees (i.e. at the mean of the altruism measure), we find a 
significantly positive interaction term Altruism × Perceived Prosocial Activity in a similar order 
of magnitude as in the OLS regressions. Hence, for more altruistic employees an increase in 
perceived social activities of the employer are associated with an increase in work engagement. 
Put together, the descriptive evidence is in line with Hypothesis 1. However, while the fixed 
effects regression can rule out that the result is driven by time constant unobserved variables that 
at the same time affect Employee Engagement and Perceived Prosocial Activity, they of course 
do not provide clean evidence on causal behavioral mechanisms and may suffer from attenuation 
bias. Furthermore, the observational data we have is not suited for testing Hypotheses 2 and 3 as 
10 
 
the data set so far does not include financial performance metrics. To explore the behavioral 
mechanisms and its implications on performance in more detail, in the next steps, we test all three 
hypotheses in a series of lab experiments.  
4 Experiment 1: Chosen Effort and Exogenous Manager Assignment 
In Experiment 1, we study the extent to which information about a manager’s prosocial behavior 
affects employees’ motivation. In order to do so, we study a simple stylized lab experiment which 
we later extend to investigate the robustness of the results in a real-effort setting in Experiment 2 
and to study further behavioral channels in Experiment 3. 
4.1 Experimental Design 
The game we used consisted of several stages and was played only once. At the beginning of the 
experiment, all participants received 25 ECU (1 ECU = 0.10 EUR) and were asked to decide how 
much of it they want to donate to the charity “Médecins sans Frontières”. They could choose a 
donation : ∈ ;0,1, . . ,25=.4 At this stage, the participants did not know anything about the rest of 
the experiment, except that there will be a second stage. 
After participants made the donating decision, they received instructions for the rest of the 
experiment. Participants were randomly assigned to groups of three – “companies” – and had a 
role of either an “owner”, “employee” or “manager”. The owners had no decision to make. The 
managers were classified as either LD (low-donation) or HD (high-donation) - types, depending 
on their previous donating decisions, and were informed about their own type as well as the 
assignment procedure.5 If a manager had donated as much or more than the median player in 
previous pilot sessions (the median was equal to 5) she was assigned to the group HD and if she 
donated less, to the group LD.6 
In the next stage, each subject in the role of an employee received an initial endowment of 100 
ECU and was asked to decide how much “effort”  ∈ ;1, . . ,100= to spend in order to generate 
what we called “resources of the company”. Employees were also informed that in the 
subsequent stage of the experiment their assigned manager would decide on the use of these 
                                                        
4 The organization “Médecins sans Frontières” is a renowned charity which received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1999. 
5 We did not frame the managers as low/high-donation types but called them managers of type X and type Y in the 
instructions explaining in detail the classification procedure. 
6 The participants in the experiment do not know that the median is 5. We ran 3 pilot sessions to set the median.  
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resources. After that, managers decided about the share of resources > they wanted to invest into 
the generation of profits/shareholder value. The remaining share of resources 1 − > was invested 
into a technology which generated money for the charity (again “Médecins sans Frontières”). The 
specific payoff functions were ? = 0.5 ∗ √> ∗ 1000 ∗ ,?B = 0.5 ∗ √> ∗ 1000 ∗ ,?C = 1 − > ∗ 1000 ∗ ,?D = 100 − ,  
for manager, owner, charity and employee, respectively. We used the strategy method (Selten, 
1967) for agents’ choices in this experiment, i.e. we asked subjects in the role of employees to 
state their effort levels for both possible manager’s types. Managers made their decision about the 
share > after observing the actual resources that resulted from the agent’s effort chosen for the 
manager’s type. 
The structure of the experiment is described in Table 2: 
Table 2: The Structure of the Game 
Stage Player Action 
1 Owner, manager, employee Donation to the charity 
2 Manager Classification as either LD or HD type 
Information about own type 
3 Employee Effort decision with the strategy method: effort 
for LD and HD managers 
4 Manager Information about the actual resources 
Decision about the profit/charity share 
5 Owner, manager, employee Information for all players about the payoffs, 
donation and the manager’s type 
   
We conducted the experiment in July 2014-October 2015 at the Cologne Laboratory for 
Economic Research using the experimental software zTree (2007). We recruited participants via 
ORSEE (2004) and ran overall 29 sessions with a total of 864 participants (240 participants in 
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Experiment 1, 267 participants in Experiment 2, and 357 participants in Experiment 3). No 
subject participated in more than one session.  
At the beginning of the experiment, participants received written instructions for the pre-stage of 
the experiment (the donating decision) and were allowed to ask questions privately. After making 
the donating decision, participants received instructions for the main part of the experiment 
where they were informed about their roles and the structure of the game. To ensure each 
participant understood the instructions, subjects had to answer comprehension questions that the 
experimenters examined before the experiment started. After completing the actual experiment, 
participants were asked to fill in a post-experiment questionnaire that included questions on 
gender, age, field of study, and motives behind the decisions. At the end, participants privately 
received their payoffs in cash and left the laboratory. Each session lasted approximately one and 
a half hours.  
We transferred the donation to “Médecins sans Frontières” after all sessions were finished. To 
ensure the donation was credible, we told students in the instructions that they could give us their 
email address if they wanted to receive a proof of the donation, and we sent them the proof at a 
later date.  
4.2 Results  
We start the description of the results with the analysis of the agents’ behavior. The left bar of 
Figure 1 displays the average effort chosen by an agent if the manager made a low donation (LD-
type), and the right bar shows the average effort, if the manager made a high donation (HD-type). 
As expected, we find that agents exert significantly more effort, for a prosocial manager – the 
average effort increases from 12.50 in LD-case to 22.14 in HD-case. The difference in effort 
levels is highly statistically significant (p<0.001, Wilcoxon two-sided Matched Pairs Signed 
Ranks test; WMPSR in following). 
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Figure 1: Average chosen effort in Experiment 1 
 
Notes: Number of observations amounts to 80 in each cell. 
 
Our model predicts that the increase in the motivation when working for a prosocial manager will 
be stronger for more prosocial agents (see Hypothesis 1). In order to investigate this prediction, 
we regress the agent’s effort choice on dummy variables for the agent’s and the manager’s type 
(column (1) in Table 3) as well as on an interaction term of both dummies (column (2) in Table 
3). We find that (i) prosocial agents exert higher efforts, (ii) agents exert higher efforts when the 
manager is prosocial and (iii) there is a complementarity between the types such that the 
motivational effect of having a prosocial manager is larger when the agent is prosocial as well. 
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Table 3: Effort as a function of the agent’s and manager’s type 
 (1) (2) 
   
HD agent 9.325*** 6.067** 
 (3.169) (2.764) 
   
HD manager 9.638*** 4.750** 
 (1.259) (2.337) 
   
HD manager x HD agent  6.517** 
  (2.740) 
   
Constant 5.506** 7.950*** 
 (2.462) (2.069) 
Observations 160 160 
R
2 0.156 0.163 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on subject in parentheses, * p<0.10,  
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
The results are in line with the descriptive field evidence presented in Section 3. Both 
observational and experimental data analyses lead us to our first result: 
Result 1. Agents exert significantly more effort if the manager is prosocial. This effect is stronger 
if the agent herself is prosocial.  
In the next step, we investigate the managers’ ex-post resource allocation decisions. Figure 2 
presents managers’ decisions about the donation/profit shares. In line with Hypothesis 2, we 
observe that LD-managers donate a lower share of resources than HD-managers. While LD-
managers invest only 8.74% of the resources into charitable donations, HD-managers invest more 
than twice as much at 19.53% (p=0.001, Mann-Whitney U test; MWU in following).7 
                                                        
7 We also tested whether HD (LD) managers with high resources donate more generously than managers of the same 
type with lower resources. We find that both types of managers choose the profit share rather independently of the 
agents’ effort, with Spearman’s rho=-0.117, p=0.595 for LD-managers and rho=-0.100, p=0.459 for HD-managers. 
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Figure 2: Average resource share invested in donations in Experiment 1 
 
Notes: Figure 2 plots the average share of the generated resources (in %) that managers invested in 
charitable donations ex-post. The number of observations amounts to 23 in LD and 57 in HD. 
 
Hence, in line with Hypothesis 2, we find that ex-ante donations are predictive of ex-post 
resource expenditures for the social cause. That is: 
Result 2. More prosocial managers donate a larger fraction of resources to the charity. 
After having shown that (i) agents work more for a prosocial manager and (ii) a prosocial 
manager donates a higher fraction of resources to the charity, we are interested in the effect of the 
two channels on the generated “shareholder value”, i.e. the owner’s profit in our experiment. 
Figure 3 displays the payoffs of the owners for the two manager types. When the owner is 
assigned to an LD-manager, her average payoff is 53.66. The owner earns slightly more when she 
works with an HD-manager with an average payoff increasing by 10.44% up to 59.26. The 
difference is not statistically significant (MWU p=0.179), but we can conclude that the owners’ 
profits are not smaller when an HD manager is in place. In fact, the monetary loss due to higher 
donations ex-post is offset by the ex-ante gain in agents’ motivation.   
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Figure 3: Owner’s payoff in Experiment 1 
 
Notes: Number of observations amounts to 23 in LD and 57 in HD. 
 
Recall, however, that our model predicts a non-monotonic effect of the manager’s prosociality on 
the value created for the owner (Hypothesis 3). As in our experimental design the information on 
the manager’s type available to the agent is binary, this non-monotonic pattern should be 
reinforced. We have seen that the binary signal that the manager belongs to the more prosocial 
group has a positive effect on employee motivation. On the other hand, as higher initial donations 
predict lower ex-post investments in profits, prosocial inclinations beyond the cut-off should have 
detrimental effects on profit.  
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Figure 4: Owner’s payoff conditional on manager’s ex-ante donation 
 
Notes: The number of observations amounts to 23, 26, 20 and 11 in groups 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively 
  
This pattern is confirmed in Figure 4 as well as the regression reported in Table 4 (column (2)). 
We regress the owner’s payoff on the dummy indicating whether the manager is classified as an 
HD-manager (which is the case when she had donated at least 5 ex-ante) and on the actual 
manager’s ex-ante donation. The regression in column 2 shows that the positive signal about the 
manager’s type increases owners’ payoffs when controlling for the manager’s actual ex-ante 
donation. But conditional on the signal, the manager’s actual ex-ante donation is negatively 
associated with owners’ payoffs. In other words, a selfish owner benefits from having a manager 
who is visibly classified as being charitable, but controlling for this signal value larger ex-ante 
donations are associated with lower profits as highly prosocial managers invest more in charitable 
donations ex-post and thus reduce “shareholder value”. 
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Table 4: Owners’ payoffs and managers’ types 
 (1) (2) 
   
HD agent 21.19*** 19.84*** 
 (7.450) (7.272) 
   
HD manager 5.277 16.15** 
 (7.101) (8.090) 
   
Initial Donation  -1.015** 
  (0.385) 
   
Constant 37.99*** 39.56*** 
 (7.825) (7.717) 
Observations 80 80 
R
2 0.121 0.169 
                 Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on subject in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
In line with Hypothesis 3, we conclude: 
Result 3. The owners’ payoffs are non-monotonic in the manager’s charitable inclinations.  
Finally, we consider the overall surplus generated, i.e. the sum of the owner’s and manager’s 
payoffs and the donation minus the effort cost. We find that the efficiency is substantially higher 
with an HD-manager (113.39) than LD-manager (150.56); p=0.018, MWU (see Figure 5). The 
choice of a prosocial manager leads to efficiency gains because (i) the overall value generated for 
the owner is not lower as ex-post losses in profits are offset by motivational gains and (ii) 
charitable donations are substantially larger when an HD-manager is in place. That is:  
Result 4. A prosocial manager leads to a higher overall surplus. 
19 
 
Figure 5: Total surplus by manager’s type in Experiment 1 
 
 
Notes: Number of observations amounts to 23 in LD and 57 in HD. 
 
5 Experiment 2: Real Effort and Exogenous Manager Assignment 
In Experiment 1 we elicited agents’ efforts in a stated effort setting. One of the advantages of 
using the stated effort setting is that we know the exact costs of effort the agents have, since we 
define them in a payoff function. However, a potential drawback of the method is that stating an 
effort is very different from exerting effort in real-world environments (see also Charness et al. 
(2018) for more discussion). In Experiment 2, we test for the robustness of the stated effort 
results by letting agents work on a real effort task instead of picking an effort level.  
5.1 Experimental Design 
In Experiment 2, in the efforts provision stage, agents work on a decoding task similar to the task 
by Charness et al. (2014). The task is to decode letters into two-digit numbers: There is a table 
with letters in the first column and numbers in the second column displayed on the computer 
screen in zTree.8 Only one particular letter in the table has to be decoded with the corresponding 
number. After a subject decodes the letter, a new table with different numbers’ and letters’ 
combinations appears. The accuracy of entries is checked and a participant cannot move to the 
                                                        
8 See instructions in Appendix for an example of a code table that we used in the experiment. 
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next decoding task if the letter is not decoded correctly. Agents have 10 minutes to work on the 
task and can decode up to 250 letters. Agents’ payoffs do not depend on the number of letters 
decoded but each decoded letter increases resources of the company. Since agents’ action space is 
different in this treatment from the main game we adjust the payoff functions with ? = 0.5 ∗ √> ∗ 400 ∗ ,?B = 0.5 ∗ √> ∗ 400 ∗ ,?C = 1 − > ∗ 400 ∗ ,?D = 100,  
where  is the amount of letters decoded by the agent. 
As in in Experiment 1, in Experiment 2, participants first made a donating decision. In the next 
step, we controlled for the ability of the participants by letting each participant work on the real 
effort task for 90 seconds, where they received 1 ECU for every correctly decoded letter. After 
the trial period, participants received instructions for the main part of the experiment in which 
they were informed about their roles and the structure of the game, and the experiment continued 
the same way as in Experiment 1. 
5.2 Results 
Figure 6 displays the average effort for LD- and HD-managers, measured by the number of 
decoded letters. On average, agents decode 137.17 letters with an LD-manager. Agents decode 
significantly more letters, if the manager is of HD-type – here the average output increases up to 
167.02 letters (p=0.013, MWU). The result also holds if we control for the ability of participants 
measured by their performance in the trial period. To derive a measure of output that takes ability 
into account that we can use for non-parametric testing, we divide the output level in the main 
part of the experiment by the number of decoded letters in the trial period for every participant.9 
When comparing this measure, we find that the difference between the output with LD- and HD-
managers stays significant with p=0.041, MWU. 
 
 
                                                        
9 In the trial period, participants decoded on average 23.92 and 23.75 letters in LD- and HD-condition, respectively. 
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Figure 6: Agents’ performance in Experiment 2 
 
Notes: Figure 6 shows the average amount of decoded letters per agent. The number of observations 
amounts to 24 in LD and 65 in HD. 
 
The first regression in Table 5 (column (1)) confirms the non-parametric result that agents work 
more for prosocial managers. Column (2) reports a regression where we interact the principal’s 
type with the agent’s type. The negative, yet not significant, coefficient of the interaction term 
indicates that – in contrast to Experiment 1 – here the principal’s and agent’s prosocial 
inclinations seem to be substitutes rather than complements. The most likely explanation for this 
pattern is a ceiling effect:  Even agents who made low donations themselves work very fast when 
the manager made a high donation. In turn, higher own prosocial inclinations cannot raise output 
further. 
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Table 5: Agent's performance as a function of the agent's and manager's type 
 (1) (2) 
   
HD agent 13.59 47.04 
 (12.06) (31.47) 
   
HD manager 30.29** 63.07** 
 (11.76) (31.63) 
   
HD manager x HD agent  -45.99 
  (33.20) 
   
Performance trial round 3.943*** 4.066*** 
 (0.894) (0.895) 
   
Constant 33.23 6.609 
 (27.16) (38.15) 
Observations 89 89 
R
2 0.249 0.289 
                       Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Moving to managers’ behavior, we replicate the results from Experiment 1 that LD-managers 
invest less resources into charitable donations ex-post. As Figure 7 shows, LD-managers spend 
only 6.63% of the resources on charitable causes, whereas HD-managers spend 19.35%. The 
difference is highly statistically significant (p<0.001, MWU).10 
                                                        
10 In addition, we test whether managers with higher resources donate more generously to the charity. We find that 
LD-managers choose the profit share independently of the agents’ effort (rho=-0.170, p=0.438). In contrast to this 
and to the results in Experiment 1, HD-managers in Experiment 2 set the profit share conditionally on the effort 
(rho=-0.407, p<0.001), i.e. the higher are the resources, the higher is the share they donate to the charity. 
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Figure 7: Average resource share invested in donations in Experiment 2 
 
Notes: Figure 7 plots the average share of the generated resources (in %) that managers invested in 
generating charitable donations ex-post. The number of observations amounts to 24 in LD and 65 in HD. 
 
In line with the results in the first experiment, we find that in Experiment 2 an owner does not 
earn less when a prosocial manager is in place even though such a manager spends more 
resources for charitable causes ex-post. On average, owners earn 107.57 with an LD-manager and 
again slightly more (112.91) with an HD-manager (p=0.893, MWU). As Figure 8 shows, there is 
again an inversely U-shaped pattern in the association between the manager’s prosocial 
inclinations and owners’ payoffs but the differences are economically smaller and statistically 
insignificant. 
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Figure 8: Owner’s payoff conditional on manager’s ex-ante donation 
 
Notes: Figure 8 displays the average owner’s payoffs conditional on the manager’s ex-ante donation. The 
number of observations amounts to 24, 28, 24 and 13 in groups 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively 
 
Finally, as in Experiment 1, we find that the overall surplus is significantly higher when an HD-
manager is employed. Figure 9 shows that the generated surplus increases from 264.72 to 328.21 
when an HD-manager is employed (p<0.001, MWU).  
Figure 9: Total surplus by manager’s type in Experiment 2 
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Notes: Figure 9 plots the overall generated surplus. The number of observations amounts to 24 in LD and 
65 in HD.  
6 Experiment 3: Chosen Effort and Endogenous Manager Assignment 
In Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, managers were exogenously assigned to owners (and 
employees). If, in addition, the owner can actively choose the type of manager she hires, the 
owner’s choice will reveal information about her own prosociality which in turn can affect the 
agent’s behavior in a positive or negative way. In this section, we test for the effects of the 
owner’s choice on agent’s motivation and firm’s profits.  
6.1 Set-Up  
The game in this treatment differs from Experiment 1 only in the owner’s action space. Here, the 
owner can choose what type of a manager she wants to employ. The assignment mechanism is 
such that if there is the same amount of owners wanting an LD (HD) manager as there are LD 
(HD) managers on the market (i.e. in the experimental session), owners are matched to the 
preferred type of a manager. If, however, there are fewer LD (HD) types than wanted, a random 
draw decides which owners get their preferred types. Using the strategy method, agents have to 
make four decisions in this treatment – for all possible combinations of the owner’s preference 
and manager’s type. The rest of the game and experimental procedure is equivalent to the 
procedure in Experiment 1. 
6.2 Predictions 
In the model we show that agents are motivated to work more for an HD-manager, because HD-
managers will donate more to the charity. However, beyond this consequentialist channel there 
may be another deontological channel that can lead to higher efforts when the owner is prosocial. 
Our reasoning here is based on Levine (1998)’s model of reciprocal altruism: by selecting a 
prosocial manager an owner may signal her own prosocial inclinations. 11 
If the intentions of the owner matter, agents care not only about the manager’s type because this 
determines the allocation of resources ex-post – but also about the owner’s objectives which may 
                                                        
11 Kajackaite and Sliwka (2017) study a formal model illustrating how reciprocal altruism can drive motivational 
effects of employers’ prosocial behavior and provide experimental evidence in line with this. 
26 
 
be signaled through her choice. By choosing a prosocial manager, an owner may signal that she 
herself is a prosocial type. As a consequence, agents who are reciprocal altruists may reward 
prosocial owners with higher efforts.  
Consider, for instance, the case where the owner stated a preference for an HD-manager and such 
an HD manager was indeed assigned to her by our matching protocol (denoted by HD-HD). Our 
hypothesis is that in this HD-HD condition, a reciprocal agent will exert more effort than in the 
LD-HD condition, in which the owner preferred an LD-manager but was assigned to an HD-
manager. The reason is that the HD-HD case signals to the agent not only that the manager will 
most likely spend more resources for social causes (as in the previous experiments) but also that 
the owner intentionally had chosen such a manager. Reciprocal altruism should then lead an 
agent to exert higher efforts. 
6.3 Results 
We start the analyses with the owners’ behavior. We find that 62.18% (74 out of 119) of the 
owners prefer a prosocial manager. Importantly, the choice of a manager correlates with the 
owner’s type – 70.45% of HD-owners (i.e. owners who had made a high donation themselves ex-
ante) prefer to select an HD-manager, whereas only 38.71% of LD-owners prefer an HD-manager 
(p=0.002, Fisher’s exact test). That is, the owner’s choice is indeed a credible signal about her 
own type.  
In the next step, we test how agents react to the owners’ choices. Figure 10 illustrates that agents 
indeed react to the preferences of the owner. Agents exert significantly less effort for an LD-
manager chosen by an owner with an LD-preference (LD-LD) – 12.01 points – than for an LD-
manager assigned to an owner with an HD-preference (HD-LD) – 13.61 points; p<0.001, 
WMPSR. Similarly, agents exert more effort for an HD-manager preferred by the owner (HD-
HD) than for an HD-manager assigned to an owner who preferred an LD-manager (LD-HD) with 
18.39 points versus 15.50 points (p<0.001, WMSPR). The results suggest that agents care about 
the owner’s type revealed through her choice of a manager and react to this information by 
adapting their efforts. Furthermore, note that independently of the owner’s preference, the effort 
for an LD-manager is always lower than for an HD-manager (the first two bars vs. the last two 
bars in Figure 10, p<0.001, WMPSR) which replicates the results from Experiments 1 and 2.  
27 
 
Figure 10: Average chosen effort in Experiment 3 
 
Notes: Number of observations amounts to 119 in each cell. 
 
In Table 6 we regress agents’ effort choices on the manager’s and the agent’s type as well as on 
the owner’s preference. The results in column (1) confirm that both, the consequentialist motive 
(“Resources of my work will be well spent”) as well as the deontological one (“The owner is 
well-intentioned”) play a role. Efforts are increasing in the manager’s actual prosocial 
inclinations (dummy variable HD manager) as well as in the owner’s prosocial intentions 
(dummy variable HD owner preference). But as the size of the coefficients indicates, the 
consequentialist motive has a stronger effect on the chosen efforts. In column (2) we include an 
interaction term between the manager’s actual type and owner’s desired type and find that the 
consequentialist and deontological effects are essentially additive.  
In column (3) we report a regression in which the manager’s actual type and the owner’s 
preferences are interacted with the agent’s type (dummy HD agent indicating whether the agent 
herself had made a high donation prior to the main experiment). We find that in contrast to 
Experiment 1, selfish agents are not motivated more by HD-managers than LD-managers. Selfish 
agents do not react to the owner’s preferences for a prosocial manager neither. The interaction 
terms in column (3) show that the main effects found in columns (1) and (2) are driven by the 
prosocial agents. 
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Table 6: Effort as a function of the agent’s, manager’s type and owner’s preference 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
HD manager 4.134*** 3.496*** 0.329 
 (0.772) (0.873) (1.191) 
    
HD owner preference 2.244*** 1.605*** 0.814 
 (0.578) (0.601) (0.547) 
    
HD agent 8.803*** 8.803*** 5.095** 
 (1.973) (1.975) (2.197) 
    
HD manager x HD owner preference  1.277  
  (0.827)  
    
HD agent x HD manager   5.392*** 
   (1.507) 
    
HD agent x HD owner preference   2.025** 
   (0.952) 
    
Constant 5.475*** 5.795*** 8.093*** 
 (1.680) (1.694) (1.827) 
Observations 476 476 476 
R
2 0.130 0.130 0.140 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on subject in parentheses, * p<0.10,  
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
As in previous sections, next we investigate the managers’ resources allocation decisions. We 
replicate the result from Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 that LD-managers donate a lower share 
of the resources than HD-managers – while LD-managers donate only 6.34% of the resources, 
HD-managers give away 25.44% (p=0.001, MWU).12 
In line with the results in Experiments 1 and 2, we find that in Experiment 3 an owner does not 
earn less with an HD-manager than with an LD-manager. On average, owners earn 45.46 in the 
LD-LD case. Their earnings are (statistically insignificantly) higher in the HD-HD case – 52.70; 
p=0.245, MWU.13 Importantly, in line with Experiments 1 and 2, the generated donation and 
                                                        
12 We also test whether LD (HD) managers with high resources donate more generously than managers of the same 
type with lower resources. We find that both types of managers choose profit shares independently of the agents’ 
effort, with Spearman’s rho=-0.217, p=0.156 for LD-managers and rho=-0.179, p=0.124 for HD-managers. 
13 In the LD-HD and HD-LD cases, the owners earn an average of 43.34 and 54.22. We do not further analyze the 
non-matching interests’ cases, since the observations amount to only 12 and 13 in each cell.  
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overall efficiency are higher with an HD manager: In the LD-LD vs. HD-HD comparison, the 
overall surplus increases from 96.14 up to 142.30 (p=0.004, MWU) and the donation changes 
from 16.25 to 56.44 (p<0.001, MWU).  
Put together, the results from Experiment 3 replicate the key results from Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2: (i) agents work more when resource allocation decisions are made by prosocial 
managers, (ii) prosocial managers donate a higher share of profits, (iii) having a prosocial 
manager in place does not lead to a reduction in profits but (iv) leads to efficiency gains. 
Moreover, Experiment 3 also shows that the motivational gains from picking a prosocial manager 
are not only caused by consequentialist motives but also because such a choice reveals the 
prosocial intentions of those who made the decision. 
7 Conclusion 
Milton Friedman’s famous dictum that a manager’s responsibility is “to make as much money as 
possible” for the owners of a firm still constitutes an important benchmark in the debate on the 
social responsibility of business. We show in a formal model and a series of lab experiments that 
the normative content of this recommendation necessitates a careful distinction between ex-ante 
motives and ex-post results. We show that it may be preferable from an ex-ante perspective to 
have a manager in place who ex-post does not follow Friedman’s postulation. Our key argument 
is that granting the responsibility to allocate generated resources ex-post to someone who has an 
intrinsic interest for something beyond the mere maximization of shareholder value can serve as a 
commitment device to motivate employees. 
The simplest examples of a firm contributing to social causes are donations to charity. But the 
argument put forward can also be interpreted in a wider sense. For instance, think of a manager in 
a consumer products company who faces the choice whether to implement a feature in a product 
that raises the utility of customers without raising profits. Or consider a manager in a tech 
company who decides upon open sourcing software components or a manager of a 
pharmaceutical company deciding about the pricing of a drug for a third world country that has a 
choice between charging a monopoly price or a price that would lead to lower profits but help to 
save lives of more patients. Many employees of such firms will have a preference for the more 
prosocial choice that may reduce profits and thus for instance also lead to lower dividend 
payments. Having a management in place that intrinsically cares also for broader welfare rather 
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than mere profit maximization will generate trust in employees that the fruits of their work efforts 
will not be narrowly used only to make as much money as possible for shareholders. If this leads 
to a higher employee motivation, shareholders may even benefit in the longer term even though 
profits are lower in the short term.  
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Appendix 
 
Proofs 
Proof Proposition 1: The function is strictly concave. From solving the first order condition, 
− 12  − 01$ + 12 01$ = 0 
the optimal resource allocation decision directly follows. ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: The agent’s objective function is strictly concave. The first order 
condition is 
 ⋅ F $$ + $  12 01$ − 01 = 0 ⇔ 
 = H ⋅ F $$ + $  12I
$$01. 
The first derivative of the objective function is always strictly positive when  ,  > 0. Hence,  = 0 if either  = 0 or  = 0. 
The agent will choose  =  if the first derivative of the objective function is strictly positive at  = , which is equivalent to 
HF $$ + $  12I
$$01 > . 
When there is an internal solution, the first derivative of  with respect to  is 
JJ = 22 − 1 K0$$01 ⋅ -L$ $ + $⁄  12/ $$01 
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and the cross derivative is J$JJ = 4 2 − 1$⁄ K0$$011 2⁄  $$01$ $ + $⁄ $0$$01 $ $ + $ $⁄ > 0 
 ■ 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
By inserting the manager’s donation decision and the agent’s optimal effort choice we obtain 
1 − ,  = 1 − N H ⋅ F $$ + $  12I
$$01 -1 − $$ + $ / 
which can be simplified to 
1 − ,  = √1 −  O2P 1$01 $  1Q0$$ + $  $01. 
The first derivative with respect to  is strictly positive iff 14 − 2 $  1Q0$01$ + $  $01 − $  1Q0$ 2 − 1 $ + $  $0101 > 0 
⇔ $2 − 1 > $  
such that it is increasing in   iff  < S9$01.  ■ 
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Instructions 
Below you find translated instructions for the “Real Effort and Exogenous Manager Assignment” 
treatment. The instructions for other two treatments are equivalent and can be provided under 
request. Original instructions were in German. 
Instructions (Part I) 
 
Welcome to our experiment! Please read the instruction carefully. If you have a question, please 
raise your hand. We will come over to you and answer your question. Communication with other 
participants is not allowed. If you break this rule, we will have to exclude you from the 
experiment and you will not receive any payment. Please switch off your mobile phone or any 
other devices which may disturb the experiment. 
Every participant will receive 2.50 Euros for attending, which will be paid out independently of 
the decisions made in the experiment. 
Furthermore, you can get additional payoffs in this experiment. The procedure is described more 
precisely below. In the experiment, experimental currency units (ECU) are used. The payoff in 
ECU will be converted into euros and paid in cash. The exchange ratio is: 
 
10 ECU=1 Euro 
 
Neither during the experiment, nor after the experiment will any of the participants be informed 
about the identity of other participants or about their payoffs. 
The experiment consists of three parts.  
 
Part I: 
 
You and all other participants will receive a starting cash balance of 25 ECU. You can decide 
which amount you want to donate to the charity organization “Ärzte ohne Grenzen e.V.” You can 
pick any amount between 0 and 25 ECU.  
Your payoff and the donation in part I will be calculated in the following way:  
 
Your payoff = 25 – your donation 
 
Donation = your donation 
 
 
After the experiment, the donations will be accumulated and transferred to „Ärzte ohne Grenzen 
e.V.“. We will donate the money immediately after the experiment. If you want to receive the 
proof about the donation, please write down your email address and we will send the proof to 
you.  
 
After part I is over, all participants will receive instructions for part II. That is, all participants 
will have information about the content of part II only after part II is over.  
If you have any questions, please raise your hand.  
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Comprehension questions 
 
To make sure that every participant understands the instruction, please answer the following 
questions. The payoffs in the answers should not include the show-up fee.  
Question 1: You donated 20 ECU. What are your payoff and the donation in part I?  
Your payoff: ___ ECU 
Donation: ___ ECU 
 
Question 2: You donated 2 ECU. What are your payoff and the donation in part I?  
Your payoff: ___ ECU 
Donation: ___ ECU 
 
Instructions (Part II): 
 
On your computer screen, you will see a table with two columns (one column with letters and one 
column with numbrs), which looks similar to this table:  
 
Your task is to decode the letter in the middle of the bottom of the screen. The number which is 
in the same row as the letter is the code of the letter. In the example above, letter “K” needs to be 
decoded. From the table it follows that the number which decodes “K” is “49”, because they are 
placed in the same row. So your task is to write “49” in the middle of the bottom of the screen. 
After typing in the number, please click on the OK-button.   
As soon as the letter is decoded correctly, a new table will show up and your task will be to 
decode a new letter. If you will make a mistake when decoding a letter, a message will appear 
and you will have to correct the mistake to move forward.  
You will have 90 seconds for this task. You will receive 1 ECU for every correctly decoded 
letter. The remaining time will be shown on the screen.  
 
 
Your payoff = 1 ECU * amount of correctly decoded letters  
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After part II is finished, you will receive instructions for part III. That is, all participants will find 
out about the content of part III only after part II is over.  
If you have any questions please raise your hand.  
 
Instructions (Part III) 
 
In this part of the experiment there are three types of participants: owners, managers and 
employees. One owner, one manager and one employee build a “firm”. The roles are assigned 
randomly and stay the same for the whole experiment.  
In a minute, you will be shown your role on the computer screen. Please write down your role 
and then keep reading the instructions.  
 
My role: __________________ 
 
 
 
Managers will be divided into two groups/types depending on their donation in the first part of 
the experiment. The managers who donated the least (the managers who donated less than the 
half of the participants in previous sessions of the experiment) build the group X. The managers 
who donated the most (the managers who donated the same or more than the half of the 
participants in previous sessions of the experiment) build group Y. All participants will be 
informed about the group of the manager.  
 
The owners make no decisions.  
 
Each employee has 10 minutes to work on the decoding task. The task is identical to the task in 
part II. The task is to decode the letter in the middle of the bottom of the screen. As soon as the 
letter is decoded correctly, a new table will show up and the employee can decode then a new 
letter. There is a maximum of 250 tables that will appear one after the other. That is, the 
employee can decode a maximum of 250 letters.  
In this part of the experiment, the employee receives a fix amount of 100 ECU. Before the 
employee starts working, he will be informed about the type of the manager. The employee will 
be informed, whether the manager who was assigned to him is type X (relatively low donation) or 
type y (relatively high donation).  
The employee decides who much he wants to work on the task. For each correctly decoded letter 
there will be 1 ECU added to the resources of the company (you will learn more about it in a bit). 
Each ECU that the employee adds to the resources of the company will be multiplied with 400.  
 
The resources will be calculated in the following way:  
 
 
 
Resources = amount of correctly decoded letters * 400 ECU 
 
 
In the next step, the manager learns about the resources generated by the employee and decides 
on how to invest the resources. The investments generate the profit of the firm and a donation to 
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TUVWXX%YZ[\]%% = 100 
social causes. The manager decides which part of the resources X he invests in profits and which 
part 1-X he invests in a donation. The donation goes to the charity „Ärzte ohne Grenzen e.V.“ 
The generated profit will be divided between the owner and the manager. In other words, the 
higher is the donation, the less earn the manager and the owner.  
The payoffs of managers, owners, employees and the donation will be calculated in the following 
way:  
 
   TUVWXX^_^#%` = 0,5 ∗ a ∗ 400 ∗ U)Wb+( WX W(cV :W:: c(('  
 
 TUVWXXBd_%` = 0,5 ∗ a ∗ 400 ∗ U)Wb+( WX W(cV :W:: c(('  
 
 eW+U(*W+ = 1 − a ∗ 400 ∗ U)Wb+( WX W(cV :W:: c(('  
 
 
  
 
For illustration purposes:  
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Before the employees and managers make their decisions, all participants will participate in a 
trial round. In the trial round, there will be calculator shown on the computer screen and you can 
try out different values of the amount of decoded letters and the share X to calculate the profit 
and donation. In this way, you will get a feeling about the structure of the payoff.  
After the trial round, the order of part III will be the following: 
1. The managers will be assigned to either group X or group Y dependent on the previous 
donation. The manager will be informed about his group. The employee and owner who 
are assigned to the manager will also be informed about the type of the manager.  
2. The employee works on the task and therewith determines the size of the resources.  
3. The manager observes the size of the resources and decides which part of the resources he 
invests in profit and donation.  
4. All participants find out about their payoffs.  
 
After the experiment, the donations will be accumulated and transferred to „Ärzte ohne Grenzen 
e.V.“. We will donate the money immediately after the experiment. If you want to receive the 
proof about the donation, please write down your email address and we will send the proof to 
you. 
If you have any questions please raise your hand. 
 
Comprehension questions 
 
Question 1: The manager has donated 4 ECU in the first part of the experiment. The half of 
participants in previous sessions has donated at least 14 ECU. In which group is the manager?  
o X 
o Y 
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Question 2: The employee has decoded 10 letters. The manager set the share X (profits) to 0.3. 
How large are the payoffs in part III? 
Profit employee: ___ECU 
Profit manager: ___ECU 
Profit owner: ___ECU  
Donation: ___ECU 
 
Question 3: The employee has decoded 200 letters. The manager set the share X (profits) to 1. 
How large are the payoffs in part III? 
Profit employee: ___ECU 
Profit manager: ___ECU 
Profit owner: ___ECU  
Donation: ___ECU 
 
Question 4: The employee has decoded 100 letters. The manager set the share X (profits) to 0.7. 
How large are the payoffs in part III? 
Profit employee: ___ECU 
Profit manager: ___ECU 
Profit owner: ___ECU  
Donation: ___ECU 
 
 
